The Dupuis Zillow ruling allows agents’ and brokerages’ claims over alleged software tying and mortgage steering to proceed. On September 28, 2026, U.S. District Judge James L. Robart denied Zillow’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The order did not establish liability, certify a class, award damages or rewrite participants’ contracts. Read the court’s order.

For brokerage leaders, the useful distinction is between two alleged conditions on referral access: buying a particular customer relationship management (CRM) system and directing buyers toward a particular lender. They raise separate questions about software choice, client recommendations and participation terms.

Which case and motion did the court decide?

The case is Dupuis et al. v. Zillow Group Inc. et al., No. 3:26-cv-05049-JLR, in the Western District of Washington. The named plaintiffs are Stephanie M. Dupuis, Sound Music I Inc., Brian Graham and Anna Alvarez.

The public docket identifies the amended complaint as document 27, filed May 4, 2026, and Zillow’s motion to dismiss it as document 30, filed June 1. The September 28 order is document 37.

The surviving claims include Sherman Act claims, state antitrust and consumer-protection claims, and unjust enrichment. Dupuis is separate from Taylor v. Zillow, the consolidated litigation involving claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, or RESPA. A Taylor court filing identifies that proceeding as No. 2:25-cv-01818-JLR. The Dupuis ruling did not decide Taylor.

What the pleading standard requires

Zillow sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally plausible claim. At this stage, the court accepts sufficiently pleaded factual allegations as true and reads them favorably to the plaintiffs. It need not accept unsupported legal conclusions, formulaic assertions or unreasonable inferences. Order, pages 6–7.

The judge’s discussion of alleged coercion and competitive harm therefore does not establish that those events happened. It explains why the complaint cleared the legal threshold challenged by Zillow’s motion.

Market definition illustrates the distinction. Zillow challenged the proposed product and geographic markets. Robart found that real estate search, customer referrals, CRM software and residential mortgage lending were sufficiently pleaded as distinct markets, with plausible nationwide boundaries. Those determinations do not amount to final findings about market power or competitive effects. Order, pages 7–12.

How the two alleged mechanisms differ

Follow Up Boss tying allegations concern a software purchase

The plaintiffs allege that Zillow conditioned access to customer referrals on purchasing and using Follow Up Boss, or FUB. Under this tying theory, referrals are the service agents want; the CRM subscription is the separate product they allegedly must also buy. The asserted harm includes mandatory software costs and exclusion of competing CRM providers. Order, pages 4 and 12–17.

Dupuis’s account in the amended complaint makes the alleged cost concrete. She alleges that she was told to adopt FUB or lose Preferred program access, and incurred approximately $500 a month plus additional user-licensing and training costs. That is her alleged expense, not a universal FUB price or a court-verified loss. Amended complaint, paragraph 46.

Zillow challenged the market-power allegations and argued that agents could leave its system. Given the pleaded dependence on referrals, the court held that those arguments did not defeat the tying claim at this stage. The claim survived under the modified per se tying framework, which requires separate products, coercion, sufficient market power and a sufficiently substantial volume of affected commerce. Order, pages 14–17.

Zillow Home Loans steering claims concern referral incentives

The second theory concerns agents’ conduct toward homebuyers. Plaintiffs allege that Zillow used mortgage preapproval targets and agent ratings to pressure participants to direct buyers to Zillow Home Loans. Missing those targets allegedly meant fewer or less valuable customer connections, or termination from the program. FUB allegedly helped track performance. Order, pages 18–21.

Here, the alleged pressure runs from access to future business through the agent’s recommendations to the buyer’s lender choice. The contested condition concerns where agents direct mortgage business.

The court analyzed this theory as an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. At the pleading stage, it treated Zillow’s contracts with brokerages and teams as sufficient to allege the required agreement and separately found competitive harm adequately alleged. Zillow argued that the complaint lacked adequate allegations of anticompetitive effects. Robart concluded that allegations about restricting buyers’ information and insulating Zillow Home Loans from competing lenders were sufficient to proceed. Order, pages 18–21.

Why contracts matter without being changed by the ruling

The scope of the participation agreements also matters to the unjust-enrichment claims, which seek recovery of benefits allegedly retained unfairly. Zillow argued that valid agreements governing program participation barred those claims.

The court allowed plaintiffs to plead unjust enrichment as an alternative theory. Its reasoning relied on allegations that participants originally agreed to exchange commission splits for leads, then faced software and mortgage-steering requirements outside that original bargain. Those allegations supplied a reason to reject dismissal. The court did not cancel agreements or issue replacement terms. Order, pages 30–35.

For leaders reviewing a referral relationship, this suggests comparing the signed agreement with later program standards, software requirements and performance communications. Our referral and compensation coverage provides related business context.

What brokerage leaders can examine now

Consider a hypothetical team that willingly chooses FUB but receives fewer referrals when its buyers obtain fewer Zillow Home Loans preapprovals. Its software preference would not answer the separate question about mortgage-related referral conditions. Conversely, a team could dispute a mandatory CRM purchase without alleging pressure over lender selection. These examples illustrate the distinction; neither establishes a violation.

A review of the relationship can ask:

• What purchases does the participation agreement require?
• Which metrics affect referral quantity, quality or continued access?
• When were those conditions communicated, and what changed?
• What records explain a reduction in referrals or a termination?

These questions can also inform reviews of other platforms used by brokerages, without assuming their arrangements resemble the allegations here.

The September 28 order contains no new operational compliance deadline. Consult counsel before changing contractual performance in reliance on it. When following subsequent developments in our housing litigation and court decisions coverage, look for the specific relief a later order actually grants.